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Abstract
The CORAS security risk modelling language is a graphical language customized for com-
munication, documentation and analysis of security threat and risk scenarios. We present a
textual syntax and a structured semantics for each of the ﬁve diﬀerent types of CORAS dia-
grams, together with step-by-step instructions on how to translate a graphical diagram via the
textual syntax into a readable paragraph of English prose, using the structured semantics. This
enables users of the CORAS language to easily extract the precise meaning of a given diagram.
The semantics is modular in the sense that the semantics of a diagram can be deduced from
the semantics of its constituents.
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 The CORAS Language 4
3 The Structured Semantics 5
4 Asset Diagrams 6
4.1 Textual Syntax of Asset Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5 Threat Diagrams 10
5.1 Textual Syntax of Threat Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6 Risk Diagrams 18
6.1 Textual Syntax of Risk Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CONTENTS
7 Treatment Diagrams 23
7.1 Textual Syntax of Treatment Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8 Treatment Overview Diagrams 28
8.1 Textual Syntax of Treatment Overview Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9 Conclusion 32
References 34
2
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
CORAS is a method for security risk analysis [4]. It comes with a specialized language for com-
munication, documentation and analysis of security threat and risk scenarios. The language was
originally deﬁned as a UML [15] proﬁle [14, 16], and has later been customized and reﬁned in
several aspects, based on experiences from industrial case studies, and by empirical investigations
documented in [5], [6] and [7].
The CORAS language is in particular intended to support brainstorming sessions used to identify
and estimate security risks. Such brainstorming sessions are characterized by the involvement of
people with thorough knowledge of speciﬁc, but only partly overlapping aspects of the target of
analysis. Typical participants are the intended users of the target, its designers, developers, and
relevant decision makers. These people normally have quite diﬀerent backgrounds and it may be
diﬃcult for the analysts to make them work well together as a group. Our experiences indicate
that the CORAS language improves both the eﬃciency of the analysis process and the quality of
the results.
We claim that our graphical approach to security risk modelling contributes to solving three
issues related to security analysis:
• How to facilitate communication in a group consisting of people with diﬀerent backgrounds and
competences: Our aim has been to provide the participants with a means of communication
that covers both technical and more high-level information, without being too complicated
to understand. Oﬀering a common basis for communication will hopefully reduce misunder-
standings and thereby give a more correct risk picture.
• How to estimate the likelihoods and consequences of identiﬁed risks: In practice, reliable data
on which this can be based is often not available. The participants must use their expert
knowledge, experience and familiarity with the domain to estimate both the likelihoods and
the consequences of incidents that might not have happened yet. Our aim has been to oﬀer
a structured, graphical risk picture to make the complexity more manageable. A graphical
representation may illustrate who or what caused the incidents and the weaknesses in the
system that made them possible.
• How to document the security analysis in a comprehensible manner: The ﬁndings of a security
analysis constitute vital information not only to the participants in the analysis, but also to
the organization as a whole. Our aim has been to deﬁne a documentation method that should
be more or less self-explanatory, and not rely on extensive training to be understood.
Although we have aimed at making a language that is easily understandable, situations in
which the intended meaning of a construct or an expression needs further explanation are bound
to arise. The main contribution of this report is the deﬁnition of a structured semantics aiming
to fulﬁl this need. The semantics takes an arbitrary CORAS diagram and delivers its intended
meaning as a readable paragraph of English. It is structured in the sense that it comes with step-
by-step instructions allowing the translation to be conducted automatically. The semantics has
been developed to meet the following success criteria:
1. The translation from CORAS diagrams to English should be modular. If we add new relations
and/or elements to a diagram we have already translated, the translation of the modiﬁed
diagram is the union of the translation of the original diagram with the translation of the new
relations and/or elements.
2. The resulting paragraph should be understandable English. The purpose of the translation is to
provide a description, in English, of a CORAS diagram, in order to communicate the meaning
of the diagram to those not familiar with the intended meaning of the various elements and
relations of the CORAS language.
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3. The translation should be easy to perform. Anyone, even someone unacquainted with CORAS
diagrams, should be able to translate a CORAS diagram into English.
4. The translation should be possible to automate. Automatic translation is a feature that will
be implemented in the CORAS tool in the future (see http://coras.sourceforge.net for
downloads and documentation).
5. It should be possible to translate inconsistent diagrams, and the translation should enable the
user to identify inconsistencies. Inconsistent diagrams should still be possible to translate,
and the resulting paragraph in English should be suﬃciently clear to allow the user to identify
the cause of the inconsistency.
The next section introduces the diﬀerent kinds of CORAS diagrams. Section 3 presents the
notation and naming conventions used in the textual syntax and structured semantics. Sections 4 -
8 present the syntax and structured semantics of each of the ﬁve types of CORAS diagrams.
Each of these sections is self-contained and includes instructions on how to translate an arbitrary
syntactically correct diagram into English. An example diagram is given as a presentation of the
graphical syntax of each diagram, which contains all possible relations. However, in order to keep
the examples to a manageable size, not all permutations of optional elements such as likelihoods
and treatment categories have been included. In the cases where one CORAS diagram type is based
on another, we still give a complete deﬁnition of its textual syntax, translation rules from graphical
to textual syntax, and from the textual syntax into English. At the end of each section we present
an example of a translation.
2 The CORAS Language
The CORAS language originates from a UML proﬁle developed as a part of the EU funded research
project CORAS (IST-2000-25031) [1] (http://coras.sourceforge.net). As a result of our work
to satisfy the modelling needs in a security risk analysis, the language and its guidelines have evolved
into a more specialized and reﬁned approach. The language is meant to support the analyst during
the security risk analysis, and serves diﬀerent purposes in each phase of the analysis. A security risk
analysis is normally structured into ﬁve phases: (1) context establishment, (2) risk identiﬁcation,
(3) risk estimation, (4) risk evaluation and (5) treatment identiﬁcation [3].
In the context establishment we employ assets overview diagrams to specify the parties of
the security analysis and their assets. The purpose is to obtain a precise deﬁnition of what the
valuable aspects of the target of analysis are, and which are the most important. From empirical
investigations [5] and ﬁeld trials we know that asset identiﬁcation and valuation is very diﬃcult, and
that mistakes or inaccuracies made there may jeopardize the value of the whole security analysis.
During risk identiﬁcation we use threat diagrams to identify and document how vulnerabilities
may be exploited by threats to initiate unwanted incidents, and which assets the unwanted incidents
aﬀect. The threat diagrams give a clear and easily understandable overview of the risk picture and
make it easier to see who or what the threat is, how the threat works (threat scenarios) and which
vulnerabilities and assets they involve.
The threat diagrams are used as input to the risk estimation phase, where unwanted incidents
are assigned likelihood estimates and possible consequences. The likelihood estimation is often a
diﬃcult task, but illustrating the unwanted incidents in the correct context has proved very helpful
in practice.
After the risk estimation, the magnitude of each risk can be calculated on the basis of its
likelihood and consequence, and modelled in risk diagrams. The risk diagrams specify which threats
initiate the diﬀerent risks, and exactly which assets they may harm. This risk representation is
then compared to predeﬁned risk tolerance levels to decide which ones need treatments.
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In the treatment identiﬁcation, the threat diagrams containing the risks that cannot be tolerated
are used as basis for treatment identiﬁcation. In this phase the appropriate treatments are identiﬁed
and modelled in treatment diagrams. The resulting treatment diagrams can be seen as a plan for
how to deal with the identiﬁed risks.
Communicating the results of an analysis in such a way that they are well understood by
decision makers can be challenging. The CORAS language supports this by oﬀering treatment
overview diagrams. Treatment overview diagrams may for example be used to provide a high level
summary when presenting the main ﬁndings from an analysis.
To summarize, the CORAS language consists of ﬁve diﬀerent kinds of diagrams: asset diagrams,
threat diagrams, risk diagrams, treatment diagrams and treatment overview diagrams. Their basic
building blocks are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Basic building blocks of the CORAS diagrams
3 The Structured Semantics
The structured semantics for the CORAS language is divided into two separate steps:
(A) The translation of a diagram into its textual syntax, and
(B) The translation of the textual syntax into its meaning as a paragraph in English.
Hence, the semantics enables the user of CORAS to extract the meaning of an arbitrary CORAS
diagram by applying ﬁrst (A), then (B).
Both these steps, and therefore the structured semantics, are modular: a diagram is translated
relation by relation, vertex by vertex.
To characterize the textual syntax for the CORAS language, we use ISO's standardized Extended
BNF notation [10]. The vertical bar _|_ represents options, braces {_} (respectively {_}−) means
an ordered sequence of zero (respectively one) or more repetitions of the enclosed element, and
square brackets [_] denotes optional features. The terminal operators are surrounded by quotes:
`_'.
To improve readability, we do not resolve all the EBNF deﬁnitions completely into terminal
operators, but stop at the level of identiﬁer, linguistic term and numerical value. An identiﬁer is a
name or a natural language description of an element, i.e. a ﬁnite sequence of upper- and lower-case
letters, numbers, spaces and punctuation marks. Its precise deﬁnition in EBNF is
identiﬁer = {upper-case letter |lower-case letter |digit |` '|punctuation mark}− ;
uppercase letter = `A'|`B'|`C'| . . .
lowercase letter = `a'|`b'|`c'| . . .
punctuation mark = `.'|`,'|`:'| . . .
. . .
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Linguistic terms are identiﬁers which are members of a totally ordered set, for example likelihoods
given as `high', `medium' and `low'. Numerical values are just that: numbers allowing precise
calculations of likelihoods, consequences and risk values.
In the translation rules, we use V to denote the translation from graphical to textual syntax.
The translation rules for the vertices and annotations of the diagrams are given by the naming
conventions in Table 1.
Vertex Instance
party p
asset a
deliberate threat dt
accidental threat at
non-human threat nht
threat scenario ts
unwanted incident ui
risk r
treatment scenario trs
Annotation Instance
vulnerability v = {v} = V1
vulnerability set Vn = {v1, . . . , vn}
likelihood l
consequence c
risk value rv
risk function rf
Table 1: Naming conventions
When there are more than one instance of a type, we use subscripts, e.g. dt1, dt2 for two
deliberate threats. The translation from the textual syntax into English is deﬁned by a function
[[_ ]] on textual expressions. We use _ := _ to denote deﬁned as.
4 Asset Diagrams
Asset diagrams are used to give an overview of the assets within the scope of the security risk
analysis, and to show how harm to one asset may aﬀect other assets. They also present the parties
involved in the analysis, and their interest in the assets. The asset diagram has two basic building
blocks, parties and assets, shown in Figure 2. We refer to the parties and assets of an asset diagram
Figure 2: Basic building blocks of asset diagrams
as its vertices. The vertices may be connected by two kinds of ordered relations: the protect and
the indirect harm relations. The protect relation displays the relationship inherent in the deﬁnition
of an asset; i.e. that the asset is something whose value a party wants to protect. An important
part of this is the level of risk that a party is willing to accept with respect to the asset in question,
therefore we have the option to annotate the relation with the maximum acceptable risk level. The
indirect harm relation captures dependency between two assets, in the sense that harm to the ﬁrst
asset may indirectly harm the other.
To summarize, asset diagrams may contain protect relations between parties and assets, and
indirect harm relations between assets. Figure 3 shows the graphical syntax of asset diagrams.
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Figure 3: Graphical syntax of asset diagrams
4.1 Textual Syntax of Asset Diagrams
diagram = ({vertex}− , {relation});
vertex = party | asset ;
relation = protect | indirect harm;
protect = party
[risk level]· · · asset ;
indirect harm = asset −→ asset ;
party = identiﬁer ;
asset = identiﬁer ;
risk level = risk value | risk function(likelihood , consequence) |
(likelihood , consequence);
risk value = linguistic term | numerical value;
risk function = identiﬁer ;
likelihood = linguistic term | numerical value;
consequence = linguistic term | numerical value;
4.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax
We translate an asset diagram into the textual syntax schematically, vertex by vertex and relation
by relation. The set of textual expressions we obtain is the translation of the complete diagram.
4.2.1 Vertices
The translation of a vertex in the textual syntax is the label of the icon representing it in the
graphical syntax. For example, the translation of the set of vertices in Figure 3 is the set
{p1, p2, a1, a2, a3} .
Note that in this translation, the type of each node is preserved through the naming conventions
from Table 1. When the naming convention is not used we need to type each vertex, for example
in a type table, or decompose the diagram into three sets: sets of parties, sets of assets and sets of
relations.
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4.2.2 Protect relation
V p rv· · · a
The translation is similar when the relation is annotated with a risk function or a likelihood and
consequence pair instead of a risk value. In either case, replace rv with the appropriate annotation.
If the protect relation is not annotated, remove rv altogether.
4.2.3 Indirect harm relation
V a1 −→ a2
4.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English
4.3.1 Diagram
A diagram D := ({v1, . . . , vn} , {r1, . . . , rm}), n > 0,m ≥ 0, is translated by translating each of
its vertices and relations. Note that the logical conjunction implicit in the commas of the sets of
vertices and relations translates into the period at the end of each English sentence representing a
vertex or relation.
[[D ]] := [[ v1 ]] . . . [[ vn ]][[ r1 ]] . . . [[ rm ]]
4.3.2 Vertices
[[ p ]] := p is a party.
[[ a ]] := a is an asset.
4.3.3 Protect relation
[[ p · · · a ]] := p wants to protect the value of a.
[[ p
rl· · · a ]] := p wants to protect the value of a, but accepts [[ rl ]] or less.
The second expression is the translation of a protect relation annotated with a maximum acceptable
risk level. The rl for risk level is replaced by either rv, rf(l, c) or (l, c) depending on how the risk
level is formulated.
4.3.4 Indirect harm relation
[[ a1 −→ a2 ]] := a2 is harmed indirectly via a1.
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4.3.5 Annotations
[[ rv ]] := risk value rv
[[ rf (l , c) ]] := risk function rf of [[ (l , c) ]]
[[ (l , c) ]] := [[ l ]] and [[ c ]]
[[ l ]] := likelihood l
[[ c ]] := consequence c
4.4 Example
We illustrate the translation of asset diagrams with the following example:
Figure 4: Asset diagram
First we translate the vertices of the diagram: the parties and assets.
1. Governmental Data Inspectorate (GDI) is a party.
2. Company Management (CM) is a party.
3. Application availability is an asset.
4. Application interface usability is an asset.
5. Data privacy (GDI) is an asset.
6. Data privacy (CM) is an asset.
7. Company brand & reputation is an asset.
We then translate the diagram relation by relation in the order suggested in Figure 4:
1. Governmental Data Inspectorate (GDI) wants to protect the value of Data privacy
(GDI), but accepts risk value Low risk or less.
2. Company Management (CM) wants to protect the value of Application availability,
but accepts risk value Medium risk or less.
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3. Company Management (CM) wants to protect the value of Application interface us-
ability, but accepts likelihood one incident a month and consequence 50 received phone
calls to support or less.
4. Company Management (CM) wants to protect the value of Data privacy (CM), but
accepts risk value Medium risk or less.
5. Company Management (CM) wants to protect the value of Company brand & repu-
tation, but accepts risk value Low risk or less.
6. Company brand & reputation is harmed indirectly via Data privacy (GDI).
7. Company brand & reputation is harmed indirectly viaApplication interface usability.
8. Company brand & reputation is harmed indirectly via Application availability.
9. Company brand & reputation is harmed indirectly via Data privacy (CM).
We may choose to structure the sentences further to improve readability:
1. Governmental Data Inspectorate (GDI) wants to protect the value of Data privacy
(GDI), but accepts risk value Low risk or less.
2. - 5. Company Management (CM) wants to protect the value of
• Application availability, but accepts risk value Medium risk or less.
• Application interface usability, but accepts likelihood one incident a month and
consequence 50 received phone calls to support or less.
• Data privacy (CM), but accepts risk value Medium risk or less.
• Company brand & reputation, but accepts risk value Low risk or less.
6. - 9. Company brand & reputation is harmed indirectly via
• Data privacy (GDI).
• Application interface usability.
• Application availability.
• Data privacy (CM).
Note that the order of the sentences does not aﬀect the translation. In other words, the sentences
commute. The order we choose is merely a convention in order to provide a clear presentation.
5 Threat Diagrams
A threat diagram is a presentation of the chains of events initiated by threats, that have con-
sequences for the assets. Its basic building blocks are the seven elements of Figure 5: deliberate,
accidental and non-human threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, unwanted incidents, and assets.
Threat scenarios and unwanted incidents may be assigned a likelihood. We refer to the threats,
threat scenarios, unwanted incidents and assets of a threat diagram as its vertices. Vulnerabilities
and likelihoods are used as annotations. Threat diagrams have three diﬀerent relations: initiate,
leads to and impact. A threat exploits one or more vulnerabilities, initiating a threat scenario or
an unwanted incident. This is captured by the binary initiate relation. The threat scenario or
unwanted incident may then lead to new threat scenarios or unwanted incidents, either as direct
consequences or by the threat exploiting other vulnerabilities. This is captured by the binary leads
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Figure 5: Basic building blocks of threat diagrams
to relation. Either of these relations may be assigned a likelihood and/or one or more vulnerabili-
ties. The impact relation relates an unwanted incident and an asset that is harmed as a consequence
of this incident. Each impact relation may be assigned a consequence.
Figure 6 presents the graphical syntax of a threat diagram.
Figure 6: Graphical syntax of threat diagrams
5.1 Textual Syntax of Threat Diagrams
diagram = ({vertex}− , {relation});
vertex = threat | threat scenario | unwanted incident | asset ;
relation = initiate | leads to | impact ;
initiate = threat
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
threat
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident ;
leads to = threat scenario
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
threat scenario
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident |
unwanted incident
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
unwanted incident
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident ;
impact = unwanted incident
[consequence]−−−−−−−−→ asset |
threat scenario −→ asset ;
threat = deliberate threat | accidental threat | non-human threat ;
deliberate threat = identiﬁer ;
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accidental threat = identiﬁer ;
non-human threat = identiﬁer ;
vulnerability set = {vulnerability}− ;
vulnerability = identiﬁer ;
threat scenario = identiﬁer [(likelihood)] ;
unwanted incident = identiﬁer [(likelihood)] ;
asset = identiﬁer ;
likelihood = linguistic term | numerical value;
consequence = linguistic term | numerical value;
5.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax
See Section 4 for instructions on how to translate the vertices. Here we present the translation
rules including all optional elements. We then explain how the rules may be modiﬁed if one or
more of the optional elements are removed. To simplify the presentation of the translation rules,
they contain only one vulnerability, as there is no icon for vulnerability sets. In order to translate
a relation with more than one vulnerability, replace the v in the textual expression of the rule with
the set of vulnerabilities.
5.2.1 Initiate relation
V dt v l1−−→ ts
V at v l1−−→ ts
V nht v l1−−→ ts
V dt v l1−−→ ui
V at v l1−−→ ui
V nht v l1−−→ ui
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5.2.2 Leads to relation
V ts1 v l3−−→ ts2
V ts v l3−−→ ui
V ui v l3−−→ ts
V ui1 v l3−−→ ui2
5.2.3 Impact relation
V ts −→ a
V ui c−→ a
The optional elements of the threat diagram are vulnerability sets, likelihoods, and consequences.
In the case where a vulnerability or consequence is absent in the graphical expression, simply remove
the corresponding element from the textual expression (see Table 1 for an overview of naming
conventions). The translation of the relation is the same whether or not likelihoods have been
assigned to its vertices.
5.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English
5.3.1 Diagram
A diagram D := ({v1, . . . , vn} , {r1, . . . , rm}), n > 0,m ≥ 0, is translated by translating each of
its vertices and relations. Note that the logical conjunction implicit in the commas of the sets of
vertices and relations translates into the period at the end of each English sentence representing a
vertex or relation.
[[D ]] := [[ v1 ]] . . . [[ vn ]][[ r1 ]] . . . [[ rm ]]
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5.3.2 Vertices
[[ dt ]] := dt is a deliberate threat.
[[ at ]] := at is an accidental threat.
[[nht ]] := nht is a non-human threat.
[[ a ]] := a is an asset.
[[ ts ]] := Threat scenario ts occurs with undeﬁned likelihood.
[[ ts(l) ]] := Threat scenario ts occurs with [[ l ]].
[[ ui ]] := Unwanted incident ui occurs with undeﬁned likelihood.
[[ ui(l) ]] := Unwanted incident ui occurs with [[ l ]].
5.3.3 Initiate relation
The semantics for the initiate relation is independent of which kind of threat it originates from and
whether it ends in a threat scenario or an unwanted incident. In the following deﬁnitions the threat
t may be replaced by dt, at or nht, for deliberate, accidental and non-human threats respectively.
The ts representing a threat scenario may be replaced with an unwanted incident ui.
[[ t −→ ts ]] := t initiates ts with undeﬁned likelihood.
[[ t l−→ ts ]] := t initiates ts with [[ l ]].
[[ t Vn−−→ ts ]] := t exploits [[Vn ]] to initiate ts with undeﬁned likelihood.
[[ t Vn l−−−→ ts ]] := t exploits [[Vn ]] to initiate ts with [[ l ]].
5.3.4 Leads to relation
As for the initiate relation, the semantics for the leads to relation is the same whether or not it
originates and/or ends in a threat scenario or unwanted incident. The deﬁnitions below are given
for a leads to relation between threat scenarios. For the other combinations replace one or more ts
with ui(l) as before.
[[ ts1 −→ ts2 ]] := ts1 leads to ts2 with undeﬁned likelihood.
[[ ts1
l−→ ts2 ]] := ts1 leads to ts2 with [[ l ]].
[[ ts1
Vn−−→ ts2 ]] := ts1 leads to ts2 with undeﬁned likelihood, due to [[Vn ]].
[[ ts1
Vn l−−−→ ts2 ]] := ts1 leads to ts2 with [[ l ]], due to [[Vn ]].
5.3.5 Impact relation
As for the two previous relations, the semantics for the unannotated impact relation is the same
independent of whether it originates in a threat scenario or an unwanted incident.
[[ ts −→ a ]] := ts impacts a with undeﬁned consequence.
However, only impact relations originating in unwanted incidents may be annotated with con-
sequences. This relation have the following semantics:
[[ ui c−→ a ]] := ui impacts a with [[ c ]].
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5.3.6 Annotations
[[ v ]] := vulnerability v
[[Vn ]] := vulnerabilities v1, . . . , vn
[[ l ]] := likelihood l
[[ c ]] := consequence c
5.4 Example
We continue the example from the section on asset diagrams to illustrate the translation of threat
diagrams. In the threat diagram in Figure 7, we have numbered the relations from 1 to 21 in the
order in which they are translated.
Figure 7: Threat diagram
We start by translating the vertices of the diagram, from the top left to the bottom right:
1. Employee is an accidental threat.
2. IT-infrastructure is a non-human threat.
3. Threat scenario Remote access used from infected PC occurs with likelihood 1 per 6
months.
4. Threat scenario Malicious code on computer spreads via LAN occurs with likelihood
1 per year.
5. Threat scenario Server crash occurs with likelihood 1 per year.
6. Threat scenario Servers infected by malicious code occurs with likelihood 1 per 10
years.
7. Threat scenarioMalicious code traﬃc jams network occurs with likelihood 1 per year.
8. Threat scenario Malicious code distributes data occurs with likelihood 1 per 10 years.
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9. Threat scenario Application servers malfunctioning occurs with likelihood 1 per 5
years.
10. Threat scenario Application database fails to switch to backup solution occurs with
likelihood 1 per year.
11. Unwanted incident Disclosure of data occurs with likelihood 1 per 10 years.
12. Unwanted incident Corruption of data occurs with likelihood 1 per year.
13. Unwanted incident Unavailability of application occurs with likelihood 1 per year.
14. Data privacy (GDI) is an asset.
15. Data privacy (CM) is an asset.
16. Application availability is an asset.
Then we translate the relations of the diagram, in the order suggested by the numbering in
Figure 7:
1. Employee exploits vulnerability No check of virus protection level on PCs to initiate
Remote access used from infected PC with undeﬁned likelihood.
2. Employee exploits vulnerability Old antivirus to initiate Malicious code on computer
spreads via LAN with undeﬁned likelihood.
3. Employee exploits vulnerability Physical access to network to initiate Malicious code
on computer spreads via LAN with undeﬁned likelihood.
4. IT-infrastructure exploits vulnerability Hardware failure to initiate Server crash with
undeﬁned likelihood.
5. Remote access used from infected PC leads toMalicious code on computer spreads
via LAN with undeﬁned likelihood.
6. Malicious code on computer spreads via LAN leads to Servers infected by mali-
cious code with undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerabilities Old ﬁrewall, Old version of
web server.
7. Malicious code on computer spreads via LAN leads to Malicious code traﬃc jams
network with undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerability Old ﬁrewall.
8. Servers infected by malicious code leads to Malicious code distributes data with
undeﬁned likelihood.
9. Servers infected by malicious code leads toApplication servers malfunctioning with
undeﬁned likelihood.
10. Malicious code traﬃc jams network leads to Application servers malfunctioning
with undeﬁned likelihood.
11. Server crash leads to Application database fails to switch to backup solution with
undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerability Poor backup solution.
12. Malicious code distributes data leads to Disclosure of data with undeﬁned likelihood.
13. Application servers malfunctioning leads to Corruption of data with undeﬁned like-
lihood.
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14. Application servers malfunctioning leads to Unavailability of application with un-
deﬁned likelihood.
15. Application database fails to switch to backup solution leads to Corruption of data
with undeﬁned likelihood.
16. Application database fails to switch to backup solution leads to Unavailability of
application with undeﬁned likelihood.
17. Disclosure of data impacts Data privacy (GDI) with consequence 3.
18. Disclosure of data impacts Data privacy (CM) with consequence 2.
19. Corruption of data impacts Data privacy (GDI) with consequence 2.
20. Corruption of data impacts Data privacy (CM) with consequence 1.
21. Unavailability of application impacts Application availability with consequence 2.
As was the case with the asset diagrams, we may choose to structure the translation of the
relations to reﬂect the structure of the diagrams, and to make the translation more readable:
1.-3. Employee exploits vulnerability
• No check of virus protection level on PCs to initiate Remote access used from
infected PC with undeﬁned likelihood.
• Old antivirus to initiate Malicious code on computer spreads via LAN with
undeﬁned likelihood.
• Physical access to network to initiate Malicious code on computer spreads via
LAN with undeﬁned likelihood.
4. IT-infrastructure exploits vulnerability Hardware failure to initiate Server crash with
undeﬁned likelihood.
5. Remote access used from infected PC leads toMalicious code on computer spreads
via LAN with undeﬁned likelihood.
6.-7. Malicious code on computer spreads via LAN leads to
• Servers infected by malicious code with undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerabilities
Old ﬁrewall, Old version of web server.
• Malicious code traﬃc jams network with undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerability
Old ﬁrewall.
8.-9. Servers infected by malicious code leads to
• Malicious code distributes data with undeﬁned likelihood.
• Application servers malfunctioning with undeﬁned likelihood.
10. Malicious code traﬃc jams network leads to Application servers malfunctioning
with undeﬁned likelihood.
11. Server crash leads to Application database fails to switch to backup solution with
undeﬁned likelihood, due to vulnerability Poor backup solution.
12. Malicious code distributes data leads to Disclosure of data with undeﬁned likelihood.
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13.-14. Application servers malfunctioning leads to
• Corruption of data with undeﬁned likelihood.
• Unavailability of application with undeﬁned likelihood.
15.-16. Application database fails to switch to backup solution
• Corruption of data with undeﬁned likelihood.
• Unavailability of application with undeﬁned likelihood.
17.-18. Disclosure of data impacts
• Data privacy (GDI) with consequence 3.
• Data privacy (CM) with consequence 2.
19.-20. Corruption of data impacts
• Data privacy (GDI) with consequence 2.
• Data privacy (CM) with consequence 1.
21. Unavailability of application impacts CM3. Application availability with conse-
quence 2.
As we see from the example, the optimal order of the sentences depends on how you want to
structure them.
6 Risk Diagrams
A risk diagram provides a summary of a threat diagram, displaying the risks posed to the assets
by the threats. It has ﬁve basic elements: deliberate, accidental, and non-human threats, risks,
and assets (see Figure 8). A risk may be assigned a risk value, risk function, or a likelihood and
consequence pair, indicating its severity.
Figure 8: Basic building blocks of risk diagrams
All of the basic building blocks of the risk diagram are referred to as vertices. A risk diagram
has three kinds of relations: an initiate relation from a threat to a risk, a leads to relation between
risks, and an impact relation from a risk to an asset. The graphical syntax is displayed in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Graphical syntax of risk diagrams
6.1 Textual Syntax of Risk Diagrams
diagram = ({vertex}− , {relation});
vertex = threat | risk | asset ;
relation = initiate | leads to | impact ;
initiate = threat −→ risk ;
leads to = risk −→ risk ;
impact = risk −→ asset ;
threat = deliberate threat | accidental threat | non-human threat ;
deliberate threat = identiﬁer ;
accidental threat = identiﬁer ;
non-human threat = identiﬁer ;
risk = identiﬁer [(risk level)] ;
asset = identiﬁer ;
risk level = risk value | risk function(likelihood , consequence) |
(likelihood , consequence);
risk value = linguistic term | numerical value;
risk function = identiﬁer ;
likelihood = linguistic term | numerical value;
consequence = linguistic term | numerical value;
6.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax
See Section 4 for instructions on how to translate the vertices. To translate the relations from the
graphical to the textual syntax we use the following rules:
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6.2.1 Initiate relation
V dt −→ r
V at −→ r
V nht −→ r
6.2.2 Leads to relation
V r1 −→ r2
6.2.3 Impact relation
V r −→ a
6.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English
6.3.1 Diagram
A diagram D := ({v1, . . . , vn} , {r1, . . . , rm}), n > 0,m ≥ 0, is translated by translating each of
its vertices and relations. Note that the logical conjunction implicit in the commas of the sets of
vertices and relations translates into the period at the end of each English sentence representing a
vertex or relation.
[[D ]] := [[ v1 ]] . . . [[ vn ]][[ r1 ]] . . . [[ rm ]]
6.3.2 Vertices
[[ dt ]] := dt is a deliberate threat.
[[ at ]] := at is an accidental threat.
[[nht ]] := nht is a non-human threat.
[[ a ]] := a is an asset.
[[ r ]] := Risk r occurs with undeﬁned risk level.
[[ r(rv) ]] := Risk r occurs with [[ rv ]].
[[ r(rf (l , c)) ]] := Risk r occurs with [[ rf (l , c) ]].
[[ r(l , c) ]] := Risk r occurs with [[ (l , c) ]].
20
6 Risk Diagrams
6.3.3 Initiate relation
As was the case for threat diagrams, the semantics of an initiate relation is independent of which
kind of threat it originates from. In the following deﬁnition the threat t may be replaced by dt, at
or nht, for deliberate, accidental and non-human threats respectively.
[[ t −→ r ]] := t initiates r.
6.3.4 Leads to relation
[[ r1 −→ r2 ]] := r1 leads to r2.
6.3.5 Impact relation
[[ r −→ a ]] := r impacts a.
6.3.6 Annotations
[[ rv ]] := risk value rv
[[ rf (l , c) ]] := risk function rf of [[ (l , c) ]]
[[ (l , c) ]] := [[ l ]] and [[ c ]]
[[ l ]] := likelihood l
[[ c ]] := consequence c
6.4 Example
We continue the example from the last section to illustrate the translation of risk diagrams.
We start by translating the vertices of the risk diagram in Figure 10:
1. Employee is an accidental threat.
2. IT-infrastructure is a non-human threat.
3. Risk Disclosure of data 1 occurs with risk value [medium].
4. Risk Disclosure of data 2 occurs with risk value [low].
5. Risk Corruption of data 1 occurs with risk value [medium].
6. Risk Corruption of data 2 occurs with risk value [major].
7. Risk Unavailability of application occurs with risk value [medium].
8. Data privacy (GDI) is an asset.
9. Data privacy (CM) is an asset.
10. Application availability is an asset.
Translating the diagram relation by relation in the order suggested in Figure 10:
1. Employee initiates Disclosure of data 1.
2. Employee initiates Disclosure of data 2.
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Figure 10: Risk diagram
3. Employee initiates Corruption of data 1.
4. Employee initiates Corruption of data 2.
5. Employee initiates Unavailability of application.
6. IT-infrastructure initiates Corruption of data 1.
7. IT-infrastructure initiates Corruption of data 2.
8. IT-infrastructure initiates Unavailability of application.
9. Disclosure of data 1 impacts Data privacy (GDI).
10. Disclosure of data 2 impacts Data privacy (CM).
11. Corruption of data 1 impacts Data privacy (CM).
12. Corruption of data 2 impacts Data privacy (GDI).
13. Unavailability of application impacts Application availability.
Structuring the text as with the other diagrams:
1.-5. Employee initiates
• Disclosure of data 1.
• Disclosure of data 2.
• Corruption of data 1.
• Corruption of data 2.
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• Unavailability of application.
6.-8. IT-infrastructure initiates
• Corruption of data 1.
• Corruption of data 2.
• Unavailability of application.
9. Disclosure of data 1 impacts Data privacy (GDI).
10. Disclosure of data 2 impacts Data privacy (CM).
11. Corruption of data 1 impacts Data privacy (CM).
12. Corruption of data 2 impacts Data privacy (GDI).
13. Unavailability of application impacts Application availability.
7 Treatment Diagrams
A treatment diagram is a presentation of proposed treatments of elements of a threat diagram.
It expands the threat diagram, inserting the risks from the risk diagram between the appropriate
unwanted incidents and assets, and adds treatment scenarios. Its basic building blocks are shown
in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Basic building blocks of treatment diagrams
We refer to all the basic building blocks except vulnerabilities as vertices. The initiate and
leads to relations are deﬁned as for the threat diagram, adding the possibility of leads to relations
from unwanted incidents to risks. This new relation is annotated with neither vulnerabilities nor
likelihoods. As was the case for risk diagrams, the impact relation relates a risk to an asset.
We also have an additional relation, treat, from a
Treatment Category Abbreviation
avoid av
decrease likelihood dl
decrease consequence dc
share sh
retain re
Table 2: Treatment category abbreviations
treatment scenario to any other kind of element.
It may be annotated with a treatment category,
cf. the Joint Australian/New Zealand Standard
for Risk Management [3, p. 20]. The abbreviations
in Table 2 are used to annotate the treat relations
in the semantics for the treatment and treatment
overview diagrams.
Figure 12 shows the graphical syntax of treat-
ment diagrams.
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Figure 12: Graphical syntax of treatment diagrams
7.1 Textual Syntax of Treatment Diagrams
diagram = ({vertex}− , {relation});
vertex = threat | threat scenario | unwanted incident | risk | asset |
treatment scenario;
relation = initiate | leads to | impact | treat ;
initiate = threat
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
threat
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident |
threat scenario
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
threat scenario
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident |
unwanted incident
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
unwanted incident
[vulnerability set][likelihood]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident ;
leads to = unwanted incident −→ risk ;
impact = risk −→ asset ;
treat = treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ vulnerability |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat scenario |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ unwanted incident |
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treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ risk |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ asset ;
threat = deliberate threat | accidental threat | non-human threat ;
deliberate threat = identiﬁer ;
accidental threat = identiﬁer ;
non-human threat = identiﬁer ;
vulnerability set = {vulnerability}− ;
vulnerability = identiﬁer ;
threat scenario = identiﬁer [(likelihood)] ;
unwanted incident = identiﬁer [(likelihood)] ;
risk = identiﬁer [(risk level)] ;
asset = identiﬁer ;
treatment scenario = identiﬁer ;
treatment category = `avoid' | `decrease likelihood' | `decrease consequence' | `share' | `retain';
risk level = risk value | risk function(likelihood , consequence) |
(likelihood , consequence);
risk value = linguistic term | numerical value;
risk function = identiﬁer ;
likelihood = linguistic term | numerical value;
consequence = linguistic term | numerical value;
7.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax
The part of the treatment diagram in Figure 12 within the blue threat diagram-box are translated
in the section on threat diagrams. What remains to be translated are the leads to relation from an
unwanted incident to a risk, the impact relation, and the treat relations. As mentioned in earlier
sections, we include all optional elements in the translation rules.
7.2.1 Leads to relation
V ui −→ r
7.2.2 Impact relation
V r −→ a
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7.2.3 Treat relation
V trs av−→ dt
V trs av−→ at
V trs av−→ nht
V trs av−→ v
V trs av−→ ts
V trs av−→ ui
V trs av−→ r
V trs av−→ a
To obtain the translation rule for a treat relation without treatment category, remove the av-
annotation from the arrow in the textual expression. If the treat relation is annotated with a
diﬀerent treatment category, simply replace av with the appropriate abbreviation.
7.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English
The translation of the vertices and relations within the blue threat diagram-box in Figure 12 is
given in Section 5.3. The translations of risks and assets, and of the impact relation, are given in
Section 6.3. This leaves treatment scenarios, treat relations and the new leads to relation.
7.3.1 Vertices
[[ trs ]] := trs is a treatment scenario.
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7.3.2 Leads to relation
[[ ui −→ r ]] := ui leads to r.
7.3.3 Treat relation
An unannotated treat relation has the same translation, independent of the object it treats:
[[ trs −→ dt ]] := trs treats dt.
Here the dt for deliberate threat may be replaced by at, nht, v, ts, ui, r or a.
When the treat relation is annotated with a treatment category, the translation depends on
the object being treated. In the following, the annotation av may be replaced by any of the other
annotations. t for threat may be replaced by dt, at or nht.
[[ trs av−→ t ]] := trs [[ av ]] of t attacking the system.
[[ trs av−→ v ]] := trs [[ av ]] of v being exploited.
[[ trs av−→ ts ]] := trs [[ av ]] of ts being initiated.
[[ trs av−→ ui ]] := trs [[ av ]] of ui being initiated.
[[ trs av−→ r ]] := trs [[ av ]] of r.
[[ trs av−→ a ]] := trs [[ av ]] of a being harmed.
7.3.4 Annotations
The annotations left to translate are the treatment categories:
[[ av ]] := avoids the risk
[[ dl ]] := decreases the likelihood
[[ dc ]] := decreases the consequences
[[ sh ]] := shares the risk
[[ re ]] := retains the risk
7.4 Example
We continue the example from the last section to illustrate the translation of treatment diagrams:
Most of the diagram has already been translated in Sections 5.4 and 6.4. The only remaining
vertices are the treatment scenarios:
1. Increase awareness of security risks is a treatment scenario.
2. Upgrade server is a treatment scenario.
3. Limit access to network is a treatment scenario.
We translate the remaining relations in the order suggested in Figure 13:
1. Increase awareness of security risks treats No check of virus protection level on
PCs.
2. Upgrade server treats Old version of webserver.
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Figure 13: Treatment diagram
3. Limit access to network treats Physical access to network.
4. Disclosure of data leads to Disclosure of data 1.
5. Corruption of data leads to Corruption of data 2.
8 Treatment Overview Diagrams
The last kind of CORAS diagram is the treatment overview diagram. Its basis is a risk diagram, to
which the treatment scenarios of a corresponding treatment diagram are added. As in the treatment
diagram, treat relations are used to indicate the elements aﬀected by each treatment scenario. They
may be annotated with a treatment category, cf. the Joint Australian/New Zealand Standard for
Risk Management [3, p. 20]. See Table 2, p. 23, for the treatment category abbreviations. Figure 14
displays the basic component of treatment overview diagrams, and their graphical syntax is shown
in Figure 15. We refer to all of the basic building blocks as vertices.
Figure 14: Basic building blocks of treatment overview diagrams
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Figure 15: Graphical syntax of treatment overview diagrams
8.1 Textual Syntax of Treatment Overview Diagrams
diagram = ({vertex}− , {relation});
vertex = threat | risk | asset | treatment scenario;
relation = initiate | leads to | impact | treat ;
initiate = threat −→ risk ;
leads to = risk −→ risk ;
impact = risk −→ asset ;
treat = treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ threat |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ risk |
treatment scenario
[treatment category]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ asset ;
threat = deliberate threat | accidental threat | non-human threat ;
deliberate threat = identiﬁer ;
accidental threat = identiﬁer ;
non-human threat = identiﬁer ;
risk = identiﬁer [(risk level)] ;
asset = identiﬁer ;
treatment scenario = identiﬁer ;
treatment category = `avoid' | `decrease likelihood' | `decrease consequence' | `share' | `retain';
risk level = risk value | risk function(likelihood , consequence) |
(likelihood , consequence);
29
8 Treatment Overview Diagrams
risk value = linguistic term | numerical value;
risk function = identiﬁer ;
likelihood = linguistic term | numerical value;
consequence = linguistic term | numerical value;
8.2 Translation from Graphical to Textual Syntax
Most of the treatment overview diagram was translated in Section 6.2, while treatment scenarios
and the treat relation was translated in Section 7.2. The following are the relevant translation rules:
8.2.1 Initiate relation
V dt −→ r
V at −→ r
V nht −→ r
8.2.2 Leads to relation
V r1 −→ r2
8.2.3 Impact relation
V r −→ a
8.2.4 Treat relation
V trs av−→ dt
V trs av−→ at
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V trs av−→ nht
V trs av−→ r
V trs av−→ a
8.3 Translation from the Textual Syntax to English
The basic components, the treatment categories and the treat relations have the same structured
semantics as in the treatment diagram. The rest of the semantics can be found in Section 6 on risk
diagrams.
8.4 Example
We continue the example from the last section to illustrate the translation of treatment overview
diagrams:
Figure 16: Treatment overview diagram
Everything but the treat relations have already been translated:
1. Limit access to network treats Disclosure of data 1.
2. Limit access to network treats Corruption of data 2.
3. Increase awareness of security risks treats Disclosure of data 1.
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4. Increase awareness of security risks treats Corruption of data 2.
5. Upgrade server treats Disclosure of data 1.
6. Upgrade server treats Corruption of data 2.
Organising the results:
1.-2. Limit access to network treats
• Disclosure of data 1.
• Corruption of data 2.
3.-4. Increase awareness of security risks treats
• Disclosure of data 1.
• Corruption of data 2.
5.-6. Upgrade server treats
• Disclosure of data 1.
• Corruption of data 2.
9 Conclusion
The CORAS language has been designed to be easily understandable in order to aid communication
in a security risk analysis context. Even so, situations in which there is a need to explain the
intended meaning of a construct or expression are bound to arise. An example of such a situation
is when the analysis results are distributed to parties, within the client company, which have not
been part of the analysis process.
In order to ﬁll this need, this paper has presented a structured semantics for the CORAS security
risk modelling language. We have provided instructions on how to translate the two main CORAS
diagrams, via the textual syntax, into a paragraph of English.
The report satisﬁes the success criteria stated at the end of Section 1:
1. The translation from CORAS diagrams to English should be modular. We divided the trans-
lation into two independent steps: (A) Graphical to textual syntax, and (B) Textual syntax
to English. Both of these component translations are modular (the diagram and textual
expressions are translated relation by relation) so the complete translation is modular.
2. The resulting paragraph should be understandable English. The wording of the English phrases
in the structured semantics is based on the descriptions used by CORAS developers to explain
the diagrams to non-specialists during a CORAS security risk analysis. This gives us a
translation into phrases of clear, understandable English.
3. The translation should be easy to perform. The translation of a diagram is done by pattern
matching, ﬁrst by matching each relation to a translation rule and removing unwanted op-
tional elements, then by matching the resulting textual expression to a rule in the structured
semantics.
4. The translation should be possible to automate. The translation rules and the structured
semantics are presented in such a way that the pattern matching may be done automatically.
However, the structuring of the translation depends to a large degree on the structure of the
original diagram. Thus it is diﬃcult to give a general recommendation on how this is done.
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This means that while it is possible to automatically structure the translation to reﬂect the
branching nature of the CORAS diagrams, a more comprehensive structuring may require
human intervention unless the structure of the diagram adheres to a predeﬁned style.
5. It should be possible to translate inconsistent diagrams, and the translation should enable the
user to identify inconsistencies. As a CORAS diagram is translated relation by relation and
not from a more global perspective, it does not matter to the translation whether or not
the diagram is inconsistent. However, the inconsistencies may not be conspicuous before the
translation is appropriately structured.
Future Work
The work presented in this paper is the starting point for several research activities. The most
immediate would be empirical testing of the translation process and the resulting sentences. The
CORAS tool (see http://coras.sourceforge.net) will be updated to reﬂect the structure of the
textual syntax and facilitate automatic translation.
The development of the CORAS method and language continues in several projects at SINTEF
ICT, building on experiences from industrial case studies. There is also ongoing work aiming for
an integrated approach to security and usability analysis.
Related Work
Misuse cases [2, 18, 19] was an important source of inspiration in the development of the UML
proﬁle mentioned in Sec. 1. A misuse case is a kind of UML use case [11] which characterizes
functionality that the system should not allow. There are a number of security oriented extensions
of UML, e.g. UMLSec [12] and SecureUML [13]. These and related approaches, however, have all
been designed to capture security properties and security aspects at a more detailed level than our
language. Moreover, their focus is not on brainstorming sessions as in our case.
Fault tree is a tree-notation used in fault tree analysis (FTA) [9]. The top node represents an
unwanted incident, or failure, and the diﬀerent events that may lead to the top event are modelled
as branches of nodes, with the leaf node as the causing event. Our threat diagrams often resemble
fault trees, but may have more than one top node.
Event tree analysis (ETA) [8] focuses on illustrating the consequences of an event and the
probabilities of these. Event trees can to a large extent also be simulated in our notation.
Attack trees [17] aim to provide a formal and methodical way of describing the security of a
system based on the attacks it may be exposed to. The notation uses a tree structure similar to
fault trees, with the attack goal as the top node and diﬀerent ways of achieving the goal as leaf
nodes. Our approach supports this way of modelling, but additionally facilitates the speciﬁcation
of the attack initiators (threats) and the harm caused by the attack (damage to assets).
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